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Abstract 
In 2002, approximately two thirds of school teachers in the Canadian province of Alberta went 
on strike. Drawing on media, government and union documents, this case study reveals some 
contours of the political economy of labor relations in education that are normally hidden from 
view. Among these features are that the state can react to worker resistance by legally pressuring 
trade unions and justifying this action as in the public interest. This justification seeks to divide 
the working class and pit segments of it against each other. The state may also seek to limit 
discussion and settlements to monetary matters to avoid constraining its ability to manage the 
workplace or the educational system. This analysis provides a basis for developing a broader 
theory of the political economy of labor relations in education. It also provides trade unionists 
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in education with information useful in formulating a strike strategy. 
Keywords: teachers unions; labor relations; Canada; regional government; politics of education. 
La huelga de profesores de Alberta en 2002. La economía política de las relaciones 
laborales en el sector de educación 
Resumen 
En 2002, aproximadamente dos tercios de los maestros de la provincia canadiense de Alberta se 
declararon en huelga. Después de analizar documentación del gobierno, los sindicatos y de los 
medios de comunicación, este estudio de caso pone de manifiesto algunos aspectos poco 
discutidos de la economía política de las relaciones laborales en el sector educativo. Entre esos 
aspectos el Estado puede reaccionar a la resistencia de los trabajadores presionando legalmente a 
los sindicatos y justificar esa presión como una estrategia de defensa de el interés público. Esta 
justificación trata de dividir a la clase obrera y generar conflictos entre segmentos de clase. El 
Estado puede también tratar de limitar la discusión y los acuerdos a cuestiones monetarias para 
evitar que se limite su capacidad de dirigir los lugares de trabajo o el sistema educativo. Este 
análisis proporciona una base para el desarrollo de una teoría más amplia de la economía política 
de las relaciones laborales educativas. También proporciona los sindicalistas del área educacional 
con información útil para la formulación de estrategias de huelga.  
Palabras clave: sindicatos docentes, relaciones laborales, Canadá, gobierno regional; política 
educacional  
A greve de professores de Alberta em 2002. A economia política das relações de trabalho 
no setor da educação 
Resumo 
Em 2002 cerca de dois terços dos professores na Província canadense de Alberta, entraram em 
greve. Este “estudo de caso” depois de analisar a documentação do governo, sindicatos e meios 
de comunicação, mostra aspectos pouco discutidos da economia política das relações no setor 
da educação. Entre esses aspectos o Estado pode responder a resistência dos trabalhadores 
pressionando legalmente aos sindicatos e justificando a pressão como uma estratégia de defesa 
do interesse público. Esta justificativa visa dividir a classe trabalhadora e gerar conflitos entre os 
segmentos de classe. O estado também pode tentar restringir a discussão e os acordos sobre 
questões salariais para evitar limitar sua capacidade de dirigir o local de trabalho ou o sistema 
educativo. Esta análise fornece uma base para o desenvolvimento de uma teoria mais ampla da 
economia política da educação nas relações laborais. Provê também aos membros do sindicato 
informações úteis para a formulação de estratégias para a greve. 
Palavras-chave: sindicatos de professores, relações de trabalho, Canadá, política educativa do 
Governo Regional 
 
Alberta’s 2002 Teacher Strike 3 
 
Introduction 
This study examines the political economy of labor relations in Alberta’s publicly funded 
school system. It focuses on the 2002 strike by two thirds of Alberta teachers. This strike 
represented a significant challenge to the government, both as an employer and as the state. This 
case suggests three important features of the relationship between the government and the Alberta 
Teachers’ Association (ATA). First, the value of the ATA to the state was as managers of employee 
discontent. The failure to stifle or channel discontent into manageable forms and processes resulted 
in legal pressure. Second, when teachers challenged state policy, the state attempted to drive a wedge 
between teachers and other workers by constructing teacher resistance as contrary to the interests of 
the general public. It also attempted to justify its intervention in these terms. Finally, the state 
attempted to limit any discussion to “economic” matters, to minimize the impact of any settlement 
on the ability of the state to manage the workplace or the educational system.  
These features are consistent with Hyman’s (1989) analysis of trade unions as both a 
component of a capitalist society and a source of opposition to it. The features are also important 
pieces of the political context of labor relations in Alberta’s education system. Their identification 
sheds light on the underlying dynamics of labor relations and assists teachers in the development of 
future political and bargaining strategies. 
 
Labor Relations In Canadian Education 
 
Approximately 95% of all Canadian primary and secondary students attend publicly funded 
and operated schools. Canada’s constitution delegates responsibility for education (as well as labor 
law) to individual provinces and territories. Typically, these governments create locally elected 
school boards to operate schools while maintaining curricular control (Thomason, 1995). School 
funding may come from locally raised taxes, provincial grants, or some combination of the two. In 
Alberta, the provincial government provides funding to school boards; local school boards have 
effectively no independent taxation power. 
Public school teacher associations have existed in Canada since before the first World War, 
changing over time to act as professional regulatory bodies and labor unions (Lawton, Bedard, 
MacLellan, & Li, 1999; Smaller, 1998). For example, the Alberta Teachers’ Association (ATA) acts as 
the professional regulatory organization for all licensed teachers in Alberta. It also serves as a 
bargaining agent for the majority of Alberta’s teachers. Local chapters of the ATA bargain with local 
school boards, but the provincial ATA executive can veto memorandums of agreement, and school 
boards bargain within the financial parameters set by the provincial government. 
The structure of teacher bargaining varies widely among provinces. Models include 
negotiations between individual school boards and teacher locals, negotiations between the province 
and the provincial teachers’ body, and province-wide negotiations (with some issues bargained 
locally). Over time, there has been a trend towards more centralized bargaining as the proportion of 
costs covered by the provinces increases (Thomason, 1995; Lawton et al., 1999). 
At a high-level, the laws governing unionization and collective bargaining in English-
speaking Canada are strikingly similar, following the pattern set by the US Wagner Act (Thompson 
& Rose, 2003). Canadian unionization levels have declined in recent years to 30.3% in 2007, but they 
remain more than twice US levels, and unionization is highly concentrated in the public sector. 
Unionization rates among public school teachers are over 90% (Government of Canada, 2008). 
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 18 No. 3 4 
 
The expansion of collective bargaining in the public sector during the 1960s and 1970s saw 
legislation enacted that differed from that governing the private sector. Public-sector labor 
legislation varies significantly between jurisdictions and can determine the boundaries of bargaining 
units, limit the scope of negotiations, and sometimes require arbitration to settle bargaining impasse 
(Rose, 1995; Swimmer & Thompson, 1995). In this way, public sector unionization and collective 
bargaining is often constrained in ways uncommon in the private sector. Teacher unionization and 
collective bargaining may be regulated by specific legislation (Swimmer & Thompson, 1995; Lawton 
et al, 1999), although in Alberta, it occurs under the Labour Relations Code, the same legislation 
governing private-sector labor relations.  
When bargaining reaches impasse, disputes are typically resolved through strike-lock out. 
Strikes and lockouts in the primary and secondary system often spark concern that the loss of 
instructional time causes irreparable harm to students. Governments have sometimes reacted to this 
concern (and parental pressure) by mandating arbitration or by enacting back-to-work legislation. 
Historically, teachers have also been reluctant to strike due to concerns about professionalism. The 
current research on the effect of work stoppages on students is inconclusive (Thomason, 1995). 
 
The Political Economy of Labor Relations 
 
A political economy analysis examines how various groups (e.g., the state, employers, 
unions) pursue their economic interests via political means. Canadian governments began directly 
intervening in the economy to regulate employment relationships in the late 19th century. When and 
how the state chooses to intervene in labor relations is influenced by the contradictory demands 
governments face as well as by the relative political power of labor and capital (Mandel, 1992; 
Picchio, 1992; Tucker, 1983/84, 1988, 1990).  
On the one hand, the state must facilitate the capital accumulation process. That is to say, it 
must act in ways that allow capitalists to produce goods and services in a profitable manner and 
thereby encourage private investment. Failing to do so may result in an economic downturn, for 
which the government may well be held responsible. In this way states face pressure from capital to 
minimize limitations on the organization of work because this impedes profit making. Facilitating 
the capital accumulation process also requires the state to ensure there is an adequate supply of 
literate and numerate workers. However, the state faces pressure to produce these workers with as 
little impact on employer profitability (i.e., through taxation) as possible. 
On the other hand, governments must maintain their own legitimacy with the electorate as 
well as the legitimacy of the capitalist system (or social formation). The operation of capitalist 
systems often negatively affects workers, who comprise the majority of the electorate. We see this in 
the form of low pay, poor working conditions, and workplace injury and death. These effects can 
cause a loss of confidence in a particular government or in the capitalist social formation. To gain re-
election and perpetuate the capitalist social formation, the state has chosen to address these issues 
via employment laws and regulation.  
Examining post-1944 Canadian legislation about unionization and collective bargaining 
suggests that an important state goal has been to maintain economic and social stability. Employers 
are compelled to recognize unions and bargain in good faith. Unions must agree to resolve 
differences during the life of the agreement via grievance arbitration. This legal framework 
reinforces employers’ power to direct the production process. It also channels conflict and worker 
resources into a contract-centered environment characterized by highly legalistic processes that can 
bureaucratize collective action, in some ways making workers self-disciplining (Drache & Glasbeek, 
1992; Fudge & Glasbeek, 1995; Hyman, 1989; Jamieson 1968; Pentland, 1968; Russell, 1995).  
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In considering this compromise, it is important to note Canada has also witnessed significant 
and aggressive government intervention into public-sector labor disputes. This intervention is 
designed to minimize the political and financial costs of public-sector strikes (Panitch & Schwartz, 
2003). Employers have also sought to evade their statutory obligations with respect to at least some 
segments of the labor force (Fudge, Tucker, & Vosko, 2002; Vosko, 2006a). 
Governments have also altered educational policy to align it more closely with the needs of 
the capital accumulation process. This can be seen in an emphasis on developing human capital 
(based on supply-side beliefs about job creation), socializing workers to accept the existing structures 
of work and opportunity, and linking curricular goals to the needs of the labor market (Bouchard, 
1998; Livingstone, 1997; Sears, 2003). Education may also face privatization via private schools, 
contracting out services, and offloading the costs of education (cast primarily as of individual 
benefit) onto families and individuals by reducing government expenditures. Reduced expenditures 
can also push school systems into closer relationships with corporations (Harrison & Kachur, 1999). 
Unions can provide a point of resistance to this agenda (Sears, 2003). 
A systems approach to studying industrial relations has dominated industrial relations 
thinking in North America since the 1960s. It emphasizes the rules, processes and structures of 
industrial relations (Godard, 2005). For example, a systems approach might focus on “what is the 
rule and how is it applied?” This tends to ignore that the rules reflect an underlying power structure 
and can change. By contrast, this case adopts a political-economy approach focused more on 
examining how various actors (in this case, the state and the ATA) seek to pursue their economic 
interests, both at the bargaining table and in the broader political arena (Hyman, 1989). 
There has been little analysis of the political economy of labor relations in the Canadian 
school system (Ricker, 1994). The recent North American literature addressing teacher collective 
bargaining focuses on the affect of bargaining on educational reform (deMitchell & Barton, 1996; 
Eberts & Stone, 1987; Fuller and Mitchell, 2006; Goldhaber, DeArmond, Player, & Choi, 2008; 
Goldschmidt & Stuart, 1986; Hess & West, 2006; Kerchner & Koppich, 2007; Koppich, 2005), 
bargaining and wage structures (Belfield, 2005; Conley, Muncey, & Gould, 2002; Montgomery & 
Benedict, 1989; Naylor, 2002), and the strategies and activities of teacher unions (Bascia, 2000; 
Cooper & Sureau, 2008; Poole, 1999, 2000; Selinger, 1980). An interesting exception is Filson’s 
(1988) consideration of the class position of teachers and Reshef’s (2007) examination of the 
implications of government intervention in such bargaining relationships. There are also a number 
of descriptive accounts of teacher strikes, although few are scholarly (Lemke, 1982). 
Method 
The purpose of this case study is to generate insight into the political economy of this strike 
and teacher collective bargaining more generally. This begins with developing a narrative of the 
cause(s), course, and resolution of the strike. This narrative highlights the important goals and 
strategies of the state and the ATA, how the government and the teachers’ union sought to advance 
their economic interests politically, and the case allows us to discern important features of the 
political economy of labor relations in Alberta’s public education system. The case study presented 
below is based on primary and secondary documentary evidence from the 2002 Alberta teacher 
strike and the bargaining that preceded it. The controversial nature of the topic suggested that 
documentary evidence would be a more reliable source of information than interviews. Documents 
included newspaper reports, government and union press releases, and background documents, 
legislation, and minutes of the Legislative Assembly. The political importance of this strike led to a 
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rich documentary base for review. This approach tends to emphasize the goals and approach of the 
provincial ATA (and its president in particular).  
Relying solely on documentary evidence has its drawbacks. This decision was taken 
following unsuccessful inquires about interviewing key employer and governmental actors. The 
reluctance of these actors to be interviewed reflects the ongoing conflict between the ATA and the 
government as well as the operation of government confidentiality oaths. Interviewing solely labor-
side actors was rejected as being likely to unbalance research. Also of concern was the incentive for 
interviewees to revise their recollections for political advantage.  
Case studies use multiple forms of evidence to examine a phenomenon where the division 
between subject and context is unclear and the context is hypothesized to contain important 
explanatory variables (Yin, 1993, 1984). Analysis focuses on descriptive inference (i.e., understanding 
an unobserved phenomenon on the basis of a set of observations) rather than on causal inference 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994; King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994; Owens, 1982). This process yields findings 
that are analytically (if not statistically) generalizable, supporting or contradicting broad theories 
about situations through the discovery of similarities and differences between the case and the 
theory.  
The rigor of the descriptive inferences drawn by linking the data adduced in the case with 
the hypotheses can be tested against the four criteria found in the Parsons (1995) theory of 
plausibility (Weirsma 1995). First, does the explanation or theory make sense? Second, is the internal 
reasoning of the explanation of theory sound? Third, to what degree does the theory or explanation 
encompass the phenomena and are there competing explanations of equal comprehensiveness? 
Fourth, is the explanation of theory in the simplest form that adequately explains the phenomena?  
Although validity and reliability are difficult to address in case study research because of the 
fundamentally different assumptions of naturalistic research, some way to assess the rigor of 
research is necessary. This can be addressed by examining the credibility and trustworthiness of the 
research. Credibility parallels positivism’s validity but accepts that research results are constructed by 
researchers based upon their interaction with the subject (Kincheloe, 1991). This rejects belief in the 
existence of an external reality separate from the researcher (Hawkesworth, 1988). The credibility of 
the research conclusions is judged based upon the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the research 
process (i.e., were all available data sources utilized? was their use in context? were all alternative 
interpretations addressed?).  
Trustworthiness is the degree of plausibility of the study’s conclusions and replaces the 
positivist conception of reliability. Reliability provides validation (or invalidation) of generalizable 
causal models that positivist research seeks to develop. That the messy interaction between 
researcher, subject, and environment in naturalistic research makes replication of results difficult is 
not an indictment of naturalistic research because its purpose is not to create invariable causal 
models (Labaree, 1998). Rather, naturalistic research is designed to describe the world. Merriam 
(1998) suggests that by creating a thick description for the reader, the issue of reliability (i.e., 
trustworthiness) of the interpretation is passed along to the reader. Leaving a clear audit trail (e.g., 
generous citation to source materials) provides the reader with the opportunity to make their own 
judgments about whether they would arrive at the conclusions similar to those of the researcher. 
The Case 
Beginning in the early 1990s, Alberta’s ruling Progressive Conservative (PC) government 
used a neoliberal prescription as a way to re-brand the party and gain re-election. First elected in 
1971, the Conservatives were experiencing significant erosion of their support by 1990—a trend 
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some thought indicative of regime change (Dyck, 1997; Mansell, 1997). In late 1992, Ralph Klein 
was elected as party leader. Klein’s 1993 election campaign focused on Alberta’s growing debt and 
deficit (Lisac, 1995). Although Klein’s characterization of Alberta as having a spending problem has 
been widely criticized (Drugge, 1995; Flanagan, 1995; McMillan & Warrack, 1995; Taft, 1997), he 
was re-elected in a landslide. 
Following re-election, funding was reduced by 21% in post-secondary education, 17.6% in 
health-care and 12.4% in education. This somewhat overstates the reduction to education. Bruce 
and Schwartz (1997) note that half of school board funding at that time was derived from 
municipally levied school taxes, thus the government reduction meant only a 6.2% reduction in 
overall funding. Teachers also agreed to a 5% wage roll back. Subsequently, 141 school boards were 
amalgamated into 60. School boards also lost the power to levy education taxes, thereby making the 
province the sole source of school funding. Bruce and Schwartz (1997) suggest that this change was 
intended to prevent school boards from offsetting government reductions by raising locally collected 
taxes. This change also politicized the teacher collective bargaining process. Despite the continuing 
pretense of local bargaining, the provincial government became the target of teacher lobbying and 
frustration as it was the sole funder and thus the true employer (Reshef, 2007; Reshef & Rastin, 
2003).  
Alberta’s labor movement did not effectively oppose these changes. It faced a conflicted 
membership base (many of whom supported Klein’s basic approach), largely lacked the right to 
legally strike on the issue, and feared the potential of repressive legislation (Fuller & Hughes-Fuller, 
2005). Little support for resistance was forthcoming from private-sector unions, which had been 
badly hurt by both hostile legislation and the recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s (Finkel, 
2006; Taylor, 1995). When rank-and-file resistance to the cuts emerged (e.g., a 1995 wildcat strike by 
Calgary laundry workers), Alberta’s labor leaders sought to settle the strike rather than use it as a way 
to resist the Klein agenda through further escalation.  
In addition to clashes over wages and working conditions, teachers and the ATA faced 
changes in educational policy (Flowers & Booi, 1999; Mackay & Flowers, 1999). In addition to 
reducing funding, introducing privatization, and encouraging corporate partnerships, the Klein 
government completed long-term Conservative policy changes such as centralizing and 
standardizing of curriculum and student evaluation methods—changes in which affected teachers 
but in which they had little say (Mazurek, 1999; Taylor, 2001). The resulting acrimony doubtlessly 
spilled over into the 2002 strike, although clear linkages are difficult to find.  
Reshef and Rastin (2003) characterize the Alberta Teachers’ Association’s (ATA) approach 
to the Klein agenda as one of acquiescence. Several factors led the ATA executive of the day to 
believe that a confrontation with government was not in the ATA’s best long-term interests. Firstly, 
the ATA faced a fractured internal membership, with many teachers supporting Klein’s deficit 
reduction agenda. Secondly, teachers generally believed that they should not mobilize against the 
government unless their ability to carry out their professional responsibilities was compromised. 
Thirdly, conflict was (and is) embedded in the ATA’s dual role as professional regulatory body 
(wherein it acted on behalf of government) and bargaining agent. A separation of these functions or 
the end of a closed shop, as proposed in two private-member bills during the early 1990s, would 
entail at least short-term financial instability for the bargaining agent. 
By 2002, the ATA faced a very different situation. Illegal strikes in 1998 and 2001 by general 
support workers and auxiliary nursing staff had resulted in wage hikes. Registered nurses also used 
the threat of a strike during the run-up to the 2001 provincial election to achieve wage increases of 
17 to 20% (Fuller & Hughes-Fuller, 2005). Doctors had previously accepted a 21.9% increase in fees 
over a two-year period (Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2002a). Government policy also began 
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emphasizing reinvestment, and the public’s mood had shifted away from the deficit hysteria of the 
1990s. Further, the ATA had a new executive, and the consequences of the funding reductions in 
the classroom were more clearly evident (Reshef & Rastin, 2003).  
During this same period, government actions began mobilizing teacher resistance. Prior to 
the spring 2001 provincial election, the government reduced education property taxes by $135 
million. On April 5, 2001, Klein told teachers that he would “make sure that they are fairly 
compensated and given as good a work environment as possible so they will know how much they 
are appreciated” (ATA, 2001, p. 1). On April 10, 2001, the re-elected government’s throne speech 
included a specific promise for more money for teacher salaries as well as to reduce class sizes 
(Government of Alberta, 2001). This eventually led to a 6% increase over two years (No end in sight 
for strike, 2002a). The ATA viewed this as a legislative cap on salary settlements because school 
boards had only the 6% available for wage increases, and teachers would not countenance taking 
money from classrooms to fund wage increases to meet its 20% wage demand. 
In May, Minister of Learning Lyle Oberg indicated that the government would not increase 
education funding above budgeted levels. Subsequently, Members of the Legislative Assembly 
(MLAs) awarded themselves their second pay increase in a year, totaling 14.3% plus three months of 
severance pay for every year served (Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2002a). On August 31, 2001, 51 
of 62 teacher collective agreements expired. Additional public-sector settlements then occurred. In 
October, the civil servants settled for wage increases of between 12.3% and 15.7% over 2 years. In 
November, crown prosecutors were awarded pay increases ranging from 5% to 22%. The 
government also released a labor supply report indicating teacher and professor unemployment was 
2.5%, indicating a shortage existed (Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2002a). At some point (while 
accounts conflict on the timing details), the provincial government indicated that it was prepared to 
pay down the teacher’s third of a $4.7 billion unfunded pension liability. The ATA contended it was 
never a serious offer and was premised upon taking the money out of classrooms (Heymen, 2002).  
At this point, teachers and the ATA believed that bargaining with school boards was 
pointless—government funding caps meant the boards had no ability to meet the teachers’ salary 
demands. The ATA also indicated the government had reneged on its promises of additional 
funding, and the government was singling teachers out for a pay raise far lower than any other 
public sector group (including legislators), despite abundant budget surpluses (Fuller & Hughes-
Fuller, 2005).  
On February 4, 2002, 14,538 teachers in 17 locals went on strike, affecting 250,196 students 
(Reshef & Rastin, 2003). At the beginning of the second week of the strike, the government’s 
message was that the strikes were disputes between local school boards and teachers; the 
government’s role was to protect the public interest. Minister of Human Resources and 
Employment Clint Dunford (who was responsible for labor relations matters) stated, 
I want to assure students and their parents that the government is monitoring 
this situation carefully to ensure their interests are protected. … This government will 
only step in if job action by the teachers causes unreasonable hardship to third parties.… 
When these strikes end I want school boards and teachers to be able to say that they 
found local solutions to the issues in dispute and resolved their differences at the local 
bargaining table (Alberta Human Resources and Employment, 2002a, p. 1). 
As the strike entered its third week, the ATA was concerned that the government would 
legislate an end and perhaps break the ATA into two pieces with new legislation—one a union 
and the other a professional body charged with licensing (Holubitsky, 2002a). The government 
had previously broken up the nurses’ union in a similar manner following illegal strikes in the 
1980s. 
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Joining the strike in week three were 6409 teachers in three more school districts, including 
the City of Calgary, a significant source of government support. The strike expansion affected a 
further 106,649 students (Reshef & Rastin, 2003). The government increased the pressure on the 
parties to settle or face government intervention. As no new funding was forthcoming, this pressure 
was primarily aimed at reducing the ATA’s wage demands. The messaging continued to frame the 
strike as a “local matter.” Dunford stated, 
Each day children are out of school brings us closer to a situation in which 
government may be forced to weigh the rights to job action against the effect that it 
has upon third parties who are not at the bargaining table. 
 I am putting teachers and school boards on notice. It is time for them to return to 
the bargaining table and renew their efforts to find local solutions to the issues in 
dispute. Everyone agrees that this is the best possible outcome. Teachers are telling 
us they do not want to be ordered back to work and school boards are saying they do 
not believe an emergency exists yet. That tells me that local solutions are within 
reach (Alberta Human Resources and Employment, 2002b, p. 1).  
In a press release issued the same day, and immediately after discussion of Labour 
Relations Code provisions for declaring a public emergency, Minister of Learning Lyle Oberg 
noted the government was assessing whether the dispute constituted an unreasonable hardship 
for “students, families and other third parties affected by the strike. The number of public calls 
to government have been increasing, and we’ll continue to listen to Albertans” (Government of 
Alberta, 2002a, p. 1). 
A cabinet meeting that day did not yield the expected back-to-work order, with Dunford 
indicating there had been progress in negotiations until media stories of a public emergency 
declaration convinced the parties that negotiating was futile (Dolphin, 2002a).  Two days later, the 
government declared a public emergency, although no objective change in the situation had 
occurred (Alberta Human Resources and Employment, 2002c). The parties were given until March 
15 to negotiate a collective agreement or the government would have a Dispute Resolution Tribunal 
arbitrate the matter.  
The government’s rationale for declaring an emergency was five-fold. First, it asserted that 
students were in jeopardy of missing so much school that they would not be able to make up the 
lost instructional time. Second, students with special needs were particularly affected by this lost 
time. Third, support staff were being laid off and thus without pay. Fourth, student teachers were 
unable to complete their practicum, with the strike preventing them from satisfying graduation 
requirements. Finally, families were facing financial hardships caused by additional childcare 
expenses incurred during the strike (Government of Alberta, 2002b). According to Oberg, panicked 
phone calls from parents turned the dispute into an emergency (Thomson & Hrycluk, 2002a). Court 
documents subsequently revealed 90 people had called demanding government action (in a strike 
affecting approximately 357,000 students). This was approximately 9.7% of total calls on the issue. 
By contrast, nearly 300 callers supported the teachers (Kent & Holobitsky, 2002).  
According to media reports, there was not unanimity within government about this decision. 
Some legislators sought to draw out the strike to penalize teachers financially by forcing them to live 
on strike pay. “In two or three years we’ll have the same thing all over again,” a Calgary legislator 
(said). “They gotta feel some pain so they’re not likely to put us through all this the next time.” 
(Dolphin, 2002b, p. 1). Other members of the provincial assembly suggested legislating away the 
teachers’ right to strike or legislatively removing a costly pupil-teacher ratio from collective 
agreements. 
Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 18 No. 3 10 
 
The back-to-work order relieved the immediate political pressure on the government and 
gave the ATA a means by which to end the strike, through arbitration. It also demonstrated 
government resolve to health-care unions that had contracts expiring that April. However, teachers 
immediately challenged the order in court and developed a plan to withdraw voluntary services, 
including marking provincial exams, sitting on committees, and developing curriculum. Dunford 
warned that a work-to-rule campaign might contravene the illegal work stoppage provisions of the 
Labour Relations Code (Thomson & Hryciuk, 2002a). Some school boards also voiced concerns 
that arbitration could impose costs on employers regardless of the employers’ abilities to pay it 
(Holobitsky, 2002b). The bargaining structure created when the government removed school 
boards’ power to levy taxes also remained unaltered (Obsolete bargaining, 2002b; Simons, 2002). 
The ATA suggested adopting province-wide bargaining to resolve the dynamic whereby the 
province deferred bargaining matters to school board trustees and the trustees pleaded poverty 
(McGinnis, 2002).  
The government’s response to the teachers’ court challenge was to threaten back-to-work 
legislation (Thomson and Hryciuk, 2002b). On Monday, February 25, arguments about the public 
emergency declaration were heard in the Court of Queen’s Bench. While the court considered the 
case, the provincial premier mused publicly that the province might declare teachers an essential 
service and permanently remove their right to strike (Hryciuk & Barrett, 2002), although Dunford 
denied working on any essential services legislation (Cryderman, Kent, Thomas, & Hryciuk, 2002). 
On March 1, the Court quashed the government’s public emergency order. Chief Justice 
Allan Wachowich ruled that the government had failed to prove there was an emergency causing 
unreasonable hardship and that the provincial cabinet’s opinion on such matters “should be 
informed and reasonable, not whimsical, speculating or political” (Cryderman et al., 2002, p. 1). Of 
further concern was that the government treated all disputes the same, despite earlier insisting that 
school negotiations were a local matter about local issues. This drew criticism that 
The government’s failures to appreciate local issues and to prove emergent hardships 
revealed a callous presumption that local authorities can be told to negotiate, 
however powerlessly, while the province skips negotiating and proceeds directly to 
cabinet orders (New hope in teachers’ strike, 2002c, p. 1). 
With the cabinet order quashed, the ATA held off on further strike action and sought a 
meeting with the premier while it scapegoated Minister Oberg in the press (Rusnell, 2002). The 
March 4 meeting yielded a tentative agreement on an arbitration process to resolve the disputes. 
Teacher issues that the arbitration panel could not resolve would be referred to an independent 
body, what eventually became the government’s Learning Commission (Thomson, 2002). 
This agreement entailed risk for both sides. The province risked a rich settlement (thereby 
raising the expectations of health-care workers) while teachers risked alienating parents by having 
salary increases come from classroom money. Alberta school boards certainly feared getting caught 
in the middle of such a settlement—its members having to pay the settlement without any additional 
provincial money. By March 8, this agreement had begun to unravel. After meeting with 
representatives of the Alberta School Board Association (ASBA), Premier Klein announced that the 
arbitration process would deal only with salaries, a far narrower scope than the ATA understood the 
process would cover. Further, Klein suggested that the arbitrator might be directed to award only 
what school boards could pay. This shift in position may reflect pressure that Klein received within 
his own caucus from hardliners, stinging from having their back-to-work order overturned the 
previous week (Reshef, 2007; Thomson & Holobitsky, 2002). 
On March 11, 2002, the government introduced the Education Services Settlement Act (Bill 
12) to establish an arbitration process to resolve outstanding collective agreement issues 
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(Government of Alberta, 2002c). The use of legislation bypassed the public emergency requirement 
in the Labour Relations Code. Bill 12 defined employer broadly enough so that all 48 jurisdictions 
without current collective agreements (and not just the 22 jurisdictions that struck) were required to 
submit to the arbitration process, and all affected teachers were prohibited from engaging in work-
to-rule campaigns. Arbitrators were precluded from considering classroom size, student-teacher 
ratios, or instructional time. This bill also stripped terms addressing these issues from agreements 
negotiated after enactment. Awards could not require school boards to run a deficit. This effectively 
limited financial settlements to the 4% and 2% provided by the government plus any additional 
money school boards could reallocate from other programming. The government was also allowed 
to refuse to release information relevant to the arbitration.  
If illegal strikes occurred, Bill 12 allowed the Labour Relations board to suspend dues 
deductions (contrary to the Teaching Professions Act) and de-certify the ATA. Finally, Bill 12 
allowed specific penalties for the ATA, its representatives, and individual teachers who advocated or 
caused a strike (Government of Alberta, 2002d). Oberg noted that teachers had only themselves to 
blame for this process, rejecting earlier government offers, including a plan to address the teacher’s 
pension (Cotter, 2002). The legislature passed Bill 12, and the new legislation was given royal assent 
on March 14. Teachers then began a process of withdrawing voluntary services. Interestingly, by late 
March, at least eight school boards had negotiated and ratified contracts outside of the mandated 
arbitration process. The large Edmonton Public School Board (EPSB) also publicly considered 
pulling out of the Alberta School Board Association (ASBA) because (the Edmonton board alleged) 
the ASBA’s actions had poisoned the working relationship Edmonton schools had with its teachers 
(Thorne, 2002).  
By April 2, teachers  elsewhere in the province were still waiting for the government to start 
the arbitration process up (Holobitsky, 2002c). In the meantime, the provincial government sought 
graders for grade 12 provincial exams that were written in April, seeking retired teachers as well as 
graduate students and tutors from post-secondary institutions—with little luck (Maclean, 2002). 
Angry at the loss of extracurricular activities, more than 500 students cut classes on April 4 to 
protest at the legislature. Another 80 appeared on April 9. Progressive Conservative legislator Mary 
O’Neill also introduced a private member’s bill (that eventually passed) prohibiting school board 
employees from running for election to a school board (Zelgen, 2002). 
Rather suddenly, on April 19 the province and teachers signed a broad agreement to resolve 
the dispute. This deal required the government to cover the ATA’s portion of the unfunded liability 
for one year at a cost of approximately $54 million. It also amended the arbitration process to allow 
for awards that forced school boards into deficit positions and addressed non-salary items such as 
classroom sizes. The government agreed to establish a Learning Commission to examine and make 
recommendations on teaching and learning conditions set out in Section 23 of the provincial 
Educational Services Settlement Act. The government also agreed to develop a process addressing 
the unfunded teacher pension liability. The ATA agreed not to pursue any legal challenge to the 
Educational Services Settlement Act, and the ATA also agreed to endorse a resumption of voluntary 
activities by teachers (Government of Alberta, Alberta Teachers’ Association, & Alberta School 
Boards Association, 2002). 
The deal and subsequent press conference were the cause of some skepticism among 
observers, who noted that the deal addressed neither the lingering acrimony nor the root causes of 
the dispute, including the dynamics created by local bargaining but provincial funding (Dolphin, 
2002c). Teachers were also upset because their union did not tell them about the deal (or the 
negotiations) ahead of time; some continued withholding voluntary services (Braid, 2002; Myers & 
Dorworiz, 2002). 
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To its members, the ATA justified the deal and deal-making process as a politically feasible 
solution. The government was not prepared to repeal the Education Services Settlement Act but was 
willing to amend the arbitration terms if the ATA would drop its court challenge of the Act and 
recommend that teachers end their withdrawal of voluntary services. Among the risks of further 
conflict, even if the ATA won a court challenge of the Education Services Settlement Act, ATA 
leaders argued that the government might impose collective agreements through legislation, decertify 
the ATA as the bargaining representative of teachers, declare teaching to be an essential service, thus 
removing teachers' right to strike, expand the management rights of school boards, or remove from 
the ATA its role as a professional regulatory organization (Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2002b). 
The first settlements from the provincial arbitration process began arriving in June. In 
Edmonton, for example, teachers saw a 14% wage increase over 2 years. Despite earlier promises 
that the province would consider additional funding based on the awards, Oberg stated “Now that 
these settlements have been issued, school boards will need to analyze the details and determine how 
to accommodate the awards within their existing budget” (Lord, 2002, p. 1). The report of the 
Learning Commission is too long to address within the confines of this paper. Among the highlights 
are a recommendation to retain the dual role of the ATA with the right to strike—a 
recommendation supported by the government. The government remains uncommitted to the 
Commission’s recommendation to implement province-wide bargaining (Alberta Teachers’ 
Association, 2003; Reshef, 2007).  
Subsequently, there have been two major developments. The first was a month-long strike by 
teachers in the Parkland School Division in 2007. This followed a one-day lockout (ended by the 
government) in 2005. The government refrained from direct intervention in 2007, and the school 
board and ATA local entered into voluntary arbitration. The second development flows from the 
common expiration date for almost all teacher collective agreements created by the 2002 settlement. 
This situation created the potential for another province-wide strike after the expiration of these 
agreements in August 2007. This was forestalled in early 2008 when all teachers in the province 
ratified a five-year deal, an agreement that saw in part the government assume responsibility for the 
$2.1 billion portion of the unfunded pension liability teachers were paying.  
Analysis 
The purpose of this case study is to identify important features of the political context in 
which sit labor relations in Alberta’s education systems. The 2002 teacher strike represented a 
significant challenge to the government as an employer and as the state, revealing contours of the 
political economy of labor relations that are normally hidden from view. Three important features of 
the relationship between the government and the ATA merit discussion. First, the value of the ATA 
to the state was as managers of employee discontent. Failing to stifle or channel discontent into 
manageable forms and processes resulted in legal pressure. Second, when teachers challenged state 
policy, the state attempted to drive a wedge between teachers and other citizens (including other 
workers) by constructing teacher resistance as contrary to the interests of the general public. It also 
attempted to justify its intervention in these terms. Finally, the state attempted to limit any 
discussion to putatively economic matters, to minimize the impact of any settlement on the ability of 
the state to manage the workplace or the educational system. These three features are broadly 
consistent with Hyman’s (1989) analysis of trade unions as both a component of a capitalist society 
and a source of opposition to it. Each feature is further developed below. 
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S U P P R E S S I N G  C H A L L E N G E S  
It is axiomatic that unions seek to maximize their members’ wages and improve their 
working conditions when collective bargaining. In 2002, the ATA determined it was not possible to 
attain higher wages or better working conditions by bargaining with local school boards. In striking, 
the ATA explicitly sought to pressure the government into providing additional money to school 
boards and, perhaps, sought to draw the government into direct negotiations. The 2002 strike 
challenged the government in several ways. The monetary cost associated with the ATA’s demands 
ran contrary to the economic policy of the government (i.e., facilitating the capital accumulation 
process via low taxation). The political cost of conceding the ATA’s demands would undermine the 
ability of the government to contain wage demands from other unions. Further, conceding the 
ATA’s demands would also call into question the validity of the government’s prior decisions about 
funding education. Overall, this posed a significant political threat to the government. 
Consequently, the government tried several strategies to contain the problem. After 
unsuccessfully framing the dispute as between local school boards and teachers, the government 
threatened to and eventually did curtail the teachers’ right to strike. The teachers’ successful court 
challenge and withdrawal of voluntary services further intensified the conflict and saw legislative 
intervention by the state. The resulting Educational Services Settlement Act required the ATA to 
manage worker discontent by setting out penalties for strike action, thereby reinforcing the peace 
obligation that is a component of all collective agreements in Canada, where mid-contract strikes are 
statutorily precluded.  
To continue the dispute, the ATA would have to risk an illegal strike, and it subsequently 
chose to negotiate the best deal possible at that time. It is unclear what line of reasoning led to this 
choice. It may reflect a desire to consolidate gains or mitigate further losses (Fuller & Hughes-Fuller, 
2005). It may also reflect the ATA executive’s perception (correct or not) of weak membership 
support for an illegal strike. It might also indicate the ATA executive’s belief that further resistance 
would have threatened the viability of the union. This is consistent with the ATA’s justification of 
the deal to its membership and with the notion that when faced with a clear confrontation with 
capital, a union’s executive may put the survival of the union or its own interests ahead of its 
members’ goals (Brenner, 1985; Leier, 1995).  
In this analysis, we clearly see that the value of the ATA to the state was as managers of 
employee discontent. Failing to stifle or channel discontent into manageable forms and processes 
resulted in legal pressure that might be characterized as repressive of workers’ trade union rights. 
Not surprisingly, the final settlement contained an obligation of the ATA to control its members. 
 
Dividing the Working Class 
As the strike progressed, the government increasingly emphasized the purported impact of 
the strike on children (particularly those with special needs), support staff, student teachers, and 
families. This was a deliberate attempt to pit the interests of striking workers against those of other 
groups, including non-striking workers. Public sector employment involves a range of complex 
relationships, with other citizens not only being recipients of teacher services but ultimately the 
source of funding for these services.  
That said, the government’s intentions are reasonably apparent. The state sought to focus 
attention on the specific dispute and its effects. This draws attention away from examining the 
government’s role in the dispute. For example, an important contributor to the dispute was 
government policy regarding educational funding and low taxation, which supports the capital 
accumulation process. By focusing attention on how the dispute affected others, the government 
sought to avoid discussing the operation of the broader framework of class relations (Hyman, 1989). 
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Workers cannot always be pitted against one another. In 1995, laundry workers in Calgary 
struck following a decision to contract out their work. There was broad-based support from the 
public and other workers, including unions. The 1995 wildcat strike might be different in important 
ways. For example, it was perceived as resistance to a significant change in government policy, 
focused on privatization, which affected the jobs of many workers. The contracting out was also 
perceived as an injustice done to a powerless group that had already accepted significant wage 
rollbacks. And the matter concerned health care, which appears to strike a different chord with the 
public than education (Fuller & Hughes-Fuller, 2005). 
Framing the strike in terms of the public interest was also used to justify legally ending the 
strike, justification that is a statutory requirement under the Labour Relations Code before ordering 
employees back to work. The government’s failure to substantiate these claims when challenged in 
court must also be considered (Cryderman et al, 2002). As far as it is possible to determine, the 
government undertook no actual monitoring of the strike that assessed the impact on children, 
student teachers, or families. If this lack of substantiation indicates the government’s rationale for 
the public emergency declaration was entirely political, this further supports Hyman’s hypothesis 
that the government sought to maintain sectarian divisions within the working class as a way of 
managing conflict. This interpretation may be incorrect: the government may well have believed the 
rationale it was asserting, despite the absence of evidence to support it. Or, as suggested by Reshef 
(2007), the unexpected resistance generated by the ATA may have simply surprised the government, 
and this surprise may explain the poor evidentiary base available to support the government’s 
position. 
 
Monetary Nature of the Settlement 
The government clearly sought to limit the scope of the settlement to monetary matters. In 
this way, it sought to protect its right to manage the workplace and the educational system. This is 
evident in the Educational Services Settlement Act, which prohibited consideration of class size and 
instructional load as part of arbitration. It also voided any agreements signed by school boards 
addressing such matters. These constraints were inconsistent with the government’s earlier assertion 
that the disputes were local matters that ought to be resolved locally, but perhaps the provincial 
nature of the problem was already evident at that point. Deferring matters of educational quality to 
the Learning Commission (a vague and uncertain process at that time) allowed the ATA to maintain 
the appearance that classroom conditions were important to it, but without imperiling the economic 
settlement of its members.  
The subsequent agreement between the Alberta School Boards Association, the ATA, and 
the provincial government marginally loosened this prohibition, and most matters were referred to 
the Learning Commission. Included in these matters was the issue of province-wide bargaining. 
Such a bargaining model would certainly resolve the difficulty inherent in the existing bargaining 
arrangements: the funder would be at the negotiating table. But it would also allow the ATA to 
threaten the government with province-wide strikes, a much more potent threat than a series of 
local strikes. In any event, the common collective agreement expiration dates created a form of 
province-wide bargaining anyway. The ATA used this leverage in 2007 to garner a pension deal in 
exchange for five years of labor peace. This suggests some acceptance by the government that it has 
a role in bargaining, although school boards continue to act as the employer at the bargaining table. 
Reshef (2007) notes that getting drawn into the bargaining process is one of the potential outcomes 
of government intervention in industrial relations. 
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Conclusion 
While collective bargaining is often discussed in largely economic terms, it occurs within a 
political context that affects the goals and behaviors of the parties. The 2002 Alberta teacher strike 
helps us identify some of the important features of that context. First, the ability of teachers to apply 
economic pressure on their employer through strikes appears limited by the state’s ability to act as 
employer and sovereign as well as its willingness to incur the political cost of curtailing workers’ 
rights. This dynamic is much commented on in discussions of public-sector labor relations (Adell, 
Grant, & Ponak, 2001; Fuller & Hughes-Fuller, 2005; Swimmer & Thompson, 1995).  
While the prospect of legal pressure creates a deterrent to strike activity, it does not resolve 
the issues that cause bargaining impasse. Further, strikes are not only caused by rational cost-benefit 
calculations by unions; they may also be ways to vent frustration and demonstrate power and 
resolve. Strikes can also be forced on unions by the actions of their membership. In this way, the 
threat of legal repression may reduce the likelihood of but not preclude strike activity. 
The 2002 strike also demonstrates that despite this power, it can be difficult for the state to 
estimate and contain the political and financial cost of a strike. While the state was eventually 
successful in getting teachers back to work, it incurred significant financial costs as a result of its 
arbitration process. The state also experienced political costs. It is not possible to determine the 
direct relationship between the strike and declining popularity, but in a 2004 election, the 
Conservative Party won 61 of 83 ridings, down 12 ridings from 2001. The willingness of the 
government to incur $2.1 billion in pension costs in 2007 to avoid a repeat of the 2002 strike 
suggests government was mindful of the political costs of a strike. 
Strikes by public-sector workers often turn on the ability of workers to generate public 
sympathy that, theoretically, can translate into electoral costs for the government. In the short-term, 
closing schools disrupts childcare arrangements and, in the long-term, may negative affect children’s 
learning. This characteristic gives teacher strikes a high profile, which is an important component of 
generating political pressure on governments. Yet the day-to-day disruption of families’ childcare 
arrangements can be a powerful political tool that the employer can use to undermine public support 
for teachers. 
Alberta’s government clearly tried to use this tactic to shape public perceptions of the strike. 
In fact, the government went so far as to misrepresent public sentiment to justify forcing an end to 
the strike. This suggests that like nurses, teachers may be able to draw on pool of public goodwill for 
support. Subsequently, during the 2007 strike in Parkland County, the government chose not to use 
this tactic, despite the impact this month-long strike had on families. Despite the apparent 
unwillingness of workers to be pitted against each other in these cases, there is little evidence of 
broader public interest in trade union efforts, such as labor law reform. In this way, the broader 
framework of class relations remains largely unchallenged.  
Along a similar line, the government has been largely successful in ensuring that settlements 
addressed only monetary issues and did not limit its ability to manage either the workplaces or the 
educational system. This is demonstrated in the mandate of arbitrators under the Educational 
Services Settlement Act as well as the state’s willingness to pay off the teacher’s unpaid pension 
liability in 2008. By focusing attention on monetary matters, the state limited the ideological space 
available to trade unions to pursue changes in the broader framework of class relations (Hyman, 
1989). This reinforces the pressure on unions to accommodate the interests of the state. 
Overall, this case suggests that teacher unions should prepare contingency plans for state 
legal pressure if they plan to launch significant strike action. Among these ought to be some 
consideration of how to mitigate or co-opt government efforts to divide the working class and pit 
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segments of it against each other. Among the strategies may be seeking to expand the terms of the 
dispute from monetary matters to other educational issues of concern to all workers (e.g., class size, 
adequate funding). In strategizing about how to end the strike, teacher unions may wish to use the 
state’s desire to constrain the settlement to monetary terms as a lever. Seeking other outlets for non-
monetary issues may be a way to break a bargaining impasse. 
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